Update for September 25 through September 27th #ukrdailyupdate

Here is my update for September 25th through September 27th.

If you want to view the map, you can go to map.ukrdailyupdate.com. This link will always direct you to the most current version of the map.

Around Kupyansk, Ukraine is expanding its bridgeheads. The fog of war hides the full extent of their movements, and they may have moved significantly further than I show on the map. My map is very conservative.

In the north, Ukraine is attacking Dvorichne and Tavilzhanka (1). Ukraine has likely liberated Dvorichne. Their last confirmed location was roughly in the middle of the town. I have the town still set to “contested” due to this uncertainty.

Regardless, Ukraine is simultaneously attacking Tavilzhanka, a larger town immediately next to Dvorichne. Russians say Ukraine has established a foothold in the “outskirts,” but it is uncertain what that means, considering the status of Dvorichne. Ukraine may have liberated Tavilzhanka as well.

South of Kupyansk, Ukraine liberated Kupyanka Vuzlovyi (3), and they are attacking Kurylivka (2) and Kivsharivka (3). Ukraine controls at least a quarter of Kurylivka, perhaps more. They may have liberated both of these towns already.

Between September 25th and 27th, Russia repeatedly attacked Petropavlivka (4) and suffered horrific casualties. Many hundreds died, and hundreds more were wounded. If you look at the casualty counts posted by Ukraine’s MOD, you will see over 500 killed listed each of the past few days. These suicide attacks explain those losses. Russia attacked without armored vehicles or heavy equipment, with little artillery support and little air support. The air support was hindered by Ukraine’s air defense, which shot down at least three jets and an attack helicopter immediately leading up to and during these Russian attacks.

After repelling these attacks, Ukraine is working to establish complete control over Petropavlivka. Unfortunately, Ukraine had not liberated Petropavlivka as of September 26th, but maybe they did on September 27th.

Ukrainian forces are pushing around Lyman to cut it off from resupply and force a Russian withdrawal. There is a chance that Russians have a weak or nonexistent defensive line behind Lyman, so once this area breaks, Ukraine might push until they hit a natural barrier.

This area has multiple rivers, and the daily rains make it difficult to move off-road. Mother nature could end up deterring Ukrainian advances more than the Russian military.

In the past few days, Ukraine has secured Nyzhche Solone (5), Vysche Solone (6), Nove and Katerynivka (7), Zelena Dolyna and Kolodyazi (8), and Novoselivka (10). They also attack and contest Shandryholove (9) and Drobysheve (11).

There are rumors of liberation in Shandryholove, but my sources claim otherwise.

In Drobysheve, I believe Ukraine controls most of the west side of the town, and the Russians are making a sort of “last stand” on the eastern side.

Late on September 27th, Ukraine appeared to have liberated Kolodyazi, and this event could force Russia to withdraw from Drobysheve and possibly also Stavky and maybe even Lyman. The Russian supply lines are in critical danger, under fire control by the Ukrainians, and Lyman is in great danger of encirclement. There are rumors that Ukraine could also be attacking Torske from the east, but the sources are incredibly unreliable.

Ukrainian forces are slowly moving up the Oskil river (5), and they are getting close to Borova, the largest town in the area. I imagine Ukraine will continue pushing up the river until they meet with the forces near Kupyansk. However, this is of secondary importance compared to their impending victory in this second battle for Lyman.

Ukraine was climbing the hill near Spirne, nearing the peak just north of the town. North of the said peak is the Lysychansk Oil Refinery in Verkhnokamyanka, a critically important defensive position for Russia. Therefore, rather than allowing Ukraine to attack, Russia shifted forces away from attacking Bakhmut to attacking Spirne (14). These are relatively elite Wagner mercenaries supported by tanks and aircraft. In addition, there are regular bombing runs by SU-24/25. To my knowledge, Ukraine’s advance up the hill has halted, but Russia has not had success pushing Ukraine back, either.

Russian forces are repeatedly attacking in the direction of Vyimka (15), but they have made little progress. This town is heavily fortified and a key to the Ukrainian defense. However, Russia has never broken the outer fortifications to reach the outskirts of town.

Russia’s primary focus is the Bakhmut area, which is entirely irrational. At this point, Bakhmut has little, if any, strategic value for Russia. They would be better off doing something like, oh, I don’t know, not having Lyman get encircled, risking the total collapse of their entire defensive line.

Russians are attacking the eastern outskirts of Soledar (16) and the southern outskirts of Bakhmutske (17). Their progress is slow. A few days ago, Russia tried to push further southwest from Bakhmutske toward Pidhorodne (18), but I do not believe they succeeded.

Wagner is attacking Bakhmut near Patrisa Lumumby Street through an adjacent residential area (19). The fighting here is extremely intense, and both sides are taking high casualties.

Recently, Russia destroyed two bridges across the Bakhmutovka River. One of these bridges was a so-called footbridge wide enough to drive an ambulance over and was the primary medivac route. Without this bridge, medivac time has increased substantially, and as a result, soldiers have died unnecessarily.

South of Bakhmut, Russians are attacking Zaitseve from the north and south (20,21). The fighting here is increasing in intensity, especially with this two-pronged attack. Bare in mind that Zaitseve is the last significant defensive position in the southern part of Bakhmut before you reach the city.

Russians are also attacking Odradivka (22), Kurdyumivka (23), and Mayorsk (24) with limited success.

Throughout the entire Bakhmut area, Ukraine is performing active defense, where they push out and counterattack Russian troops regularly, sometimes successfully, sometimes unsuccessfully. Sometimes they take Russian positions or retake positions they had previously lost. Sometimes they take heavy casualties. I don’t mark this on the map, but I want you to understand that Ukraine is not sitting still and taking a beating. There are, in fact, daily counterattacks across this entire area.

Around Donetsk, Russia has repeatedly attacked Kamianka (25) and Pervomaiske (26). They have also launched infrequent attacks on Pobjeda (27) and Novomykhailivka (28). All without notable success. Keep in mind that Ukraine is also performing active defense in these areas and launching counterattacks daily to retake lost positions. Sometimes successfully, sometimes unsuccessfully.

On September 26th, Russia fired a missile into Kryvyi Rih airport, which caused significant damage. On September 27th, Russia fired another missile towards Kryvyi Rih from around Melitopol, although Ukrainian air defense intercepted the missile before reaching the city (my mark is arbitrary). Maybe the missile was headed for that airport.

Russia has performed a sizeable ongoing missile attack on Zaporizhzhia, primarily using s-300 anti-aircraft missiles in their ground attack mode. These missiles can deal significant damage but are inaccurate at best. Beyond spreading terror, the rockets have damaged civilian buildings, including hotels, restaurants, houses, and infrastructure items like electrical substations. Russia launches several daily attacks, often around ten missiles at a time.

In the past few days, Russia has been using so-called “Iranian suicide drones,” a Shahed-136 (and the smaller 131), to strike many targets in and around Odesa.

These weapons are more or less small cruise missiles. They are launched from a vehicle, travel up to 2200km (I am skeptical of this number), carry a roughly 20kg warhead, and attack GPS coordinates. They are around 2.5 meters wide, 3.5 meters long, weigh about 200kg, and have a speed of approximately 97 knots (180kph). They typically operate in pairs or swarms (3+ drones), and a launch vehicle (a truck) can carry five at a time.

Shahed-13 caused significant damage in Odesa, first targeting what appeared to be ammunition depots near the docks and then an administration building in the middle of the city. Rumors claim this administration building was used by the military as a headquarters, although perhaps Russia merely wanted to spread terror among the civilians. Russia also used these weapons to attack Jewish people celebrating Rosh Hashanah.

These attacks forced Ukraine to change its air defense strategy around Odesa, and on September 27th, they managed to shoot down an entire swarm of these drones, along with two missiles.