September 21st, Russian Mobilization
On September 21st, Russia declared a "partial" mobilization, effectively a full declaration of war. Russia had mobilized two times before: World War I and World War II. And now the War in Ukraine. One of these things is not like the other.
Mobilization allows Russia to conscript hundreds of thousands of men, and they will begin with conscripting those with military experience. Namely, those who have fought in Ukraine already, along with those who have fought in Russia's various other wars (Syria, Georgia, Armenia, Central African Republic, Tajikistan, Dagestan, Chechnya).
Of those with military experience, Russia plans to conscript around 300,000 soldiers and treat them as "contract" soldiers. Russia, and most other countries, treat conscripts and contract soldiers differently. Generally speaking, "conscripts" are given lesser tasks because they are assumed to serve against their will, have low morale, and have little motivation, ability, or skill. Contract soldiers are more or less told, "you signed up for this, so do it." Contract soldiers can be used aggressively and in more dangerous or complex situations.
These 300,000 men almost certainly cannot all be raised at once. Instead, they will likely come in smaller batches of around 50,000 men due to logistical restraints. Although the batches could be smaller or larger, it isn't easy to estimate what will happen.
Reportedly, Russia plans to raise between 200,000 and 700,000 more men in different phases of conscription that will occur next spring and summer. In other words, the first phase of 300,000 men will be mobilized and sent to Ukraine in the next 4-6 months, probably at a rate of 50,000 per month.
Who is eligible for conscription? All men under 50 and all women with medical training or other "suitable military qualifications." The local officials employed by the mobilization centers determine who will be conscripted in any given location to fulfill the staffing requirements of their local military units. Areas with more casualties will have more conscriptions. And we know minorities, like Buryats, have suffered disproportionately more losses. So Russia will replace wounded and dead minorities with more conscripted minorities.
But don't worry, Russia's Human Rights Council offered to strip the citizenship of all ethnic minorities who gained their citizenship in the past ten years if they do not serve in this war. Oh, and the council is generous enough to strip citizenship of all his family members as well. So, if you do not volunteer to fight in Ukraine, you and your entire family loses their citizenship.
It is unknown how mobilization will impact the course of the war. However, by my math, the Russian Federation (Russia's official army) has been fighting with around 100,000 fewer men than it expected to have at its disposal, and the LNR/DNR has approximately 70,000 fewer men than expected. So, combined, I believe Russia has between 150,000 and 200,000 fewer soldiers than they expected to have at this point in the war.
I am sorry if I am phrasing this weirdly. I do not mean casualties. I mean the available manpower. Russia started the war with its forces operating at around 60% strength, and the LNR/DNR was even worse. So I think of this situation as the total number of soldiers Russia thought they had minus the number they do have. And the deficit, in my opinion, based on the information as I understand it, is around 150,000-200,000.
Now they are raising 300,000 men, who will likely top off the strength of the units deployed, and the remainder used to rotate soldiers out of combat. In other words, I believe this 300,000 will bring Russia's military power up to what they thought they had going into the war, but not above that level.
In addition, most Russian soldiers who signed six-month contracts refused to sign a new contract and opted to leave the military. Mobilization bans this behavior and locks all soldiers within the military until Putin declares that mobilization is over. Russia intends to stop valuable veteran soldiers from leaving the war, even though these soldiers may be "spent" and unable to contribute due to combat exhaustion.
Mobilization does nothing to eliminate the problems with the Russian army: poor logistics, poor leadership, terrible military strategy, aging equipment, and dwindling weapon stocks. Remember that Russia has lost most of its elite combat units and its best equipment, pilots, and officers. So, in that sense, Russia is significantly weaker than before the war. However, Russia has forged new elite units from combat experience.
Ukraine has also gained significant combat experience and access to western technologies and has over 250,000 soldiers sitting in reserve. So, in that sense, Ukraine is better off now than before the war. However, they have taken a lot of losses, especially to their heavy equipment that is very difficult or impossible to replace.
Mobilization makes victory much more difficult for Ukraine. It promises a more protracted war with much higher casualties for both sides. But I do not believe mobilization will prevent Ukraine from eventually achieving victory.
I stated earlier that Russia plans to raise another 200,000 to 700,000 men next year. Most likely, Russia will use them to rotate other soldiers out of combat. Generally speaking, commanders should not allow their soldiers to be in combat longer than three months and definitely need to remove them from combat after six months. So 3-6 months after deploying these new soldiers, Russia will have to start rotating them out with new soldiers. Hence the additional men. Not to mention attrition caused by casualties.
Russia has likely used between 600,000 and 700,000 men to date in the War in Ukraine, accounting for rotations and casualties. This number may seem high, but I hope it puts Russia's mobilization into perspective.
